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Abstract—In this paper, we present PDP, a distributed
polling protocol that enables a set of participants to gather their
opinion on a common interest without revealing their point of
view. PDP does not rely on any centralized authority or on
heavyweight cryptography. PDP is an overlay-based protocol
where a subset of participants may use a simple sharing scheme
to express their votes. In a system of M participants arranged
in groups of size N where at least 2k−1 participants are honest,
PDP bounds the probability for a given participant to have its
vote recovered with certainty by a coalition of B dishonest
participants by π(B/N)k+1, where π is the proportion of
participants splitting their votes, and k a privacy parameter.
PDP bounds the impact of dishonest participants on the global
outcome by 2(kα + BN), where α represents the number of
dishonest nodes using the sharing scheme.
Keywords-Privacy; Distributed Polling; PDP.
I. INTRODUCTION
The privacy has become one of the top concerns and
requirements of many distributed collaborative applications.
Collaborative tasks and computations are often conducted
based on the inputs supplied by the collaborative users.
Such computations could occur between trusted partners,
between partially trusted partners, or between competitors
[2]. Online Social Networks ‘OSN’ with up to a billion users
have dramatically raised concerns on privacy leakage. As
far as privacy is concerned, users’ personal data should be
accessible only to authorized users within such networks.
Recall that an OSN could be deﬁned as a web-based
platform that allows users to share a variety of personal-
related information including: Ideas, activities, events and
interests within their individual networks. The user’s indi-
vidual networks are made up of individuals tied by one or
more speciﬁc types of interdependency, such as friendship,
common interest or other relationships. Hence, an individual
network consists in nodes (i.e. users) connected by different
types of ties which represent the relationships between such
nodes.
In some kind of social network application, even directly
connected nodes should not have access to various bits
of private information. Consider the following example of
polling within OSN: The users of a social network use
a polling to take decisions about political, professional or
social interests (e.g. the organizers of a Saturday night party
asking in a social group whether partners should be invited
too?). While participants care more and more about their
reputation, no one likes to disclose his point of view to the
other participants. Therefore, such groups need a way to
launch polling while maintaining the privacy of participant’s
point of view.
As authors of [1] point out, an easy way to conduct a poll
is to use a central server. Each participant sends its vote to a
central entity, which subsequently aggregates all votes and
computes the outcome. Besides the non-scalability of this
solution, the privacy is not ensured as participants might
generally not want their votes (and maybe even the subject
of the poll or the result) to be seen by a central entity, be it
trusted or not.
The above example could be seen as two or more parties
wanting to conduct a computation based on their private
inputs, but neither party is willing to disclose its own input
to anybody else. The problem is how to conduct such a
computation while preserving the privacy of the inputs. This
problem is referred to as Secure Multi-party Computation
problem ‘SMC’ in the literature [3].
Currently, to solve the above problems, a common strategy
is to assume the trustworthiness of the service providers,
or to assume the existence of a trusted third party, which
is risky in nowadays’ dynamic and malicious environment
[2]. Therefore, protocols that can support joint computations
while protecting the participants’ privacy are of growing
importance. In theory, the general secure multi-party compu-
tation problem is solvable [3]. However, using the solutions
derived by these general results for special cases of multi-
party computation can be impractical; special solutions
should be developed for special cases for efﬁciency reasons
[4].
In this paper, we consider a set of M participants P =
{p1, p2, ..., pm}, involved in a polling session (e.g. a set of
persons wish to launch a survey on a common interest).
Each participant will vote to express his own opinion. In
general, we denote vi the vote of the participant pi. After
the execution of the polling protocol, the output consists in
the sum of participants’ votes. The computed sum represents
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the tendency of the majority of participants. We consider
a fully decentralized scheme where there is neither central
trusted server nor an entity with a speciﬁc role. Hence,
all participants are involved in the computation of the
polling outcome. We consider polling within two choices.
Participants choose as input one of two values (e.g. (yes or
no), (agree or not agree), (support or against) etc).
Participants could either be honest or dishonest. An honest
participant strictly follows the protocol and contributes to the
veriﬁcations as long as its privacy is not compromised. A
dishonest participant may misbehave to reveal the opinion of
honest participants. An important issue is when a group of
dishonest participants, named coalition, conspires in order to
reveal the input of a given participant. We aim at enabling
participants to have precise polling’s output. At the same
time, no user should learn anything about the input of other
honest users, even if he colludes with the other malicious
users.
The key contribution of this paper consists in PDP, a
probabilistic Private Distributed Polling protocol that allows
a set of users to conduct a polling session without revealing
their choices. PDP ensures votes privacy such that, in a
system of M participants organized in groups of size N
where at least 2k−1 participants are honest, PDP bounds the
probability for a given participant to have its vote recovered
with certainty by a coalition of B dishonest participants
by π(B/N)k+1, where π is the proportion of participants
splitting their votes, and k a privacy parameter. Consider-
ing the uncertain detection where a coalition of dishonest
participants agrees on a probabilistic detection rule (section
VI. B), the probability of votes detection is represented by
the following formula : BN [
N−r
N + r(k+1)
∏B−1
i=0
N−2k−i
N−i ].
Further, PDP bounds the impact of dishonest participants on
the global outcome by 2(kα+BN), where α is the number
of dishonest nodes using the sharing scheme. To sum up,
our protocol has the following advantages: (1) The proto-
col’s output is computed by participants themselves without
interaction with any third entity; (2) The protocol preserves
data privacy such that the probability of vote detection is
related to the decision rule used by dishonest participants;
(3) The polling’s outcome is accurate when there is no
data loss or dishonest act; (4) The impact of dishonest
participants on the outcome is bounded. Moreover, PDP does
neither rely on heavyweight cryptographic techniques nor on
the trustworthiness of a third party. Reducing the usage of
cryptographic techniques helps voters to use the protocol
even with low-performance equipment. It also avoids the
need to manage key distribution.
Section 2 gives an overview of existing works. Section 3
describes the system model. The PDP protocol is described
in Section 4. In Section 5 we study the PDP performance.
In Section 6 a privacy analysis has been made. A discussion
about the impact of dishonest nodes is given in Section 7
where we compute the maximum gap on poll’s result due
to dishonest acts. Section 8 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several works have been proposed to ensure the privacy
and the anonymity of voting participants. Existing works
can be divided into two main categories: Protocols based on
cryptographic primitives and those based on secret sharing
techniques. In general, cryptographic based voting protocols
make use of one the following techniques:
• Mix-net (introduced by Chaum in [5]): In [9], the au-
thors proposed a secure anonymous channel that avoids
the problem of ciphertext length expansion. Thus, they
presented an election scheme based on the proposed
anonymous channel. Authors of [10] proposed the
Randomized Partial Checking in order to improve the
robustness of mix-net based e-voting protocols.
• Blind signature (introduced by Chaum in [6]): Authors
of [11] presented an electronic polling based on blind
signature and RSA algorithm. The considered architec-
ture assumes, in addition to the voters, a polling server
and a trusted third party.
• Homomorphic schemes based on ElGamal [7] or Pail-
lier [8] cryptosystems: In [12], the authors presented
a multi-authority secret ballot scheme based on the
ElGamal encryption. Authors of [13] proposed a voting
protocol based on [12] to improve the total complexity.
The ensured privacy relies on the trustworthiness of the
authorities. Several protocols based on homomorphic
schemes have been proposed [14-17].
The above solutions have an important computational
cost. Actually, the cryptographic based protocols help to
ensure data privacy. However, they are too complex and time
consuming for being used in a large scale polling system.
On the other hand, since the introduction of secret sharing
scheme based on polynomial interpolation by Shamir in
[18], several extensions and protocols have been proposed.
Authors of [19] and [20] proposed respectively the Veriﬁable
Secret Sharing scheme and a scheme to combine multiple
secrets by direct operations on the shares. The later was
extended in [21] where the authors showed how multiparty
computation may be conducted based on VSS. In fact, these
techniques may be used for polling application, but they
involve higher mathematics.
Moreover, based on a variation of Chaum’s mix nets,
Authors of [22] proposed AMPC (Anonymous MuliParty
Computation) which provides a generic building block for
electronic anonymity in various applications. AMPC and
enhanced check vector have been applied in [23] for e-voting
application. While powerful, this protocol differs from our
work since participants have distinct and predeﬁned roles.
This may result in decreased scalability and robustness if
speciﬁc nodes fail. Therefore, the majority of the existing
works related to voting protocols is based on cryptographic
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Figure 1. The system model
primitives, trusted third parties, or assign speciﬁc role to
some entities.
Recently, the authors of [1] proposed DPol, a protocol for
distributed polling. This protocol is based on a simple shar-
ing scheme. In DPol, the authors do not take into account
the number of participants splitting their inputs, and assume
that all participants use an identical sharing scheme. Thus,
more messages are exchanged between participants. In this
paper, we propose a distributed polling protocol that takes
into account this parameter (i.e. The number of participants
splitting their inputs). We show that this reduces the number
of exchanged messages and the execution time. We consider
two types of detections in the privacy analysis (Section VI):
Reliable and Uncertain detection of a participant’s vote.
PDP reduces the probability of reliable detection, whereas in
the uncertain detection, malicious participants do not have
any insurance that the disclosed value represents the real
participant’s input.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The model consists of M participants; each participant is
represented as a uniquely identiﬁed node. Each participant
has its private numerical input vi. The global outcome of the
polling protocol is the sum of votes made by the existing
participants (
∑
i vi).
TheM nodes are clustered into G ordered groups, from g0
from to gG−1. Each group contains Nj nodes (
∑G
j=1Nj =
M). A node pi in group gj maintains two sets of nodes: A set
Po of ofﬁcemates containing all nodes belonging to the same
group (Po = gj\{p}) (i.e. the set of participants in gj except
p) and a ﬁxed-size set Pp of proxies, containing a subset
of next group (Pp ⊆ gi+1modG). The number of proxies
for a given node is equal to 1 or 2k + 1. The procedure
to deﬁne the number of proxies is described later in this
section. Therefore, all groups virtually form a ring, g0 being
the successor of gG−1 (Fig. 1). Each group gj is a clique.
We deﬁne a client of p as a node for which p acts as a
proxy. In other words, if p is a proxy of q, then q is one of
its clients. Every node maintains a list of its clients in the
previous group (Pc ⊆ gi−1modG). A node discards every
message originating from a node that is not in Pc ∪ Po.
We assume: a random uniform distribution of nodes across
the G groups, nodes in the successor groups are distributed
uniformly at random as proxies in the predecessor groups
and messages arrive correctly to their destinations.
An overlay, respecting such system model, may be con-
structed based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHT), where
the group identiﬁer of a given node is determined based
on the node’s id (e.g. idgrp = Hash(idnode)mod(G)). The
number of proxies assigned to a given node is based on a
computation that involves node and group identiﬁers (e.g.
we may compute the hash function of the node identiﬁer
and the group number modulo a random value. If the result
is an odd number, then one proxy will be assigned to
that node, else we will associate 2k + 1 proxies). Then,
each node establishes a three-way-handshake protocol to
inform its proxies that it is one of their clients. Therefore,
each node gets the list of its clients and proxies. The list
of ofﬁcemates is received by a simple request for nodes
having the same group identiﬁer. Let us note that byzantine
agreement protocol might be used as subroutine to handle
the problem of dishonest nodes that may fake their group
membership. This issue is not treated in this work.
IV. PROTOCOL DESRIPTION
In the following, we give a description of the suggested
probabilistic Private Distributed Polling protocol (PDP). In
PDP, participants are clustered in fully connected groups
(or clusters). Participants may use a message sharing tech-
nique to encode their private inputs, in such a way that
it is not possible to differentiate a partial message from
the entire message. Then, they send the shares of their
inputs to proxies, belonging to another group. Each group
computes a partial tally that is further broadcasted to all
other groups. Each participant eventually outputs the same
global outcome.
PDP consists in three steps: Sharing, counting and broad-
casting. During the ﬁrst step, a participant generates a single
message (mi = vi) or a set of shares reﬂecting the private
input (
∑
imi = vi) and sends each generated share to one
of its proxies (Line 1 in Algorithm1). In the counting step,
each node will compute the sum of the clients shares (Line
2 in Algorithm1). Such sum is called individual tally. Then
each proxy will broadcast the result to its ofﬁcemates. Each
participant will compute the local tally which is the sum
of the individual tallies received from its ofﬁcemates (Line
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Figure 2. PDP protocol
Algorithm 1 Node p in group gi, i ∈ {0, .., G− 1}
Input: a vote v ∈ {−1,+1}
Variables:
an individual tally, it = 0
a local tally, lt = 0
an array of local tally sets, S[{1, .., G}]
a local tally array, T [1, .., G]
Output: the global tally gt
Polling Algorithm
1. vote(v, Pp)
2. local count(it, Pp)
3. lt = lt+ it
4. local tally broadcast(i, lt, Pp)
5. gt =
∑
i T [i]
3 in Algorithm1). Finally, the local tallies are forwarded
along the ring so that all nodes eventually compute the ﬁnal
outcome, named global tally (Line 4, 5 in Algorithm 1).
Step 1: Sharing. (Fig. 2 (a)) Each participant node could
cast its vote as a single share or as a set of 2k + 1 shares.
Votes are encoded in boolean value (+1 or −1). To split
a vote into 2k + 1 messages, the messages and their sum
should belong to the set {−1,+1} (i.e.∀i,mi ∈ {−1,+1}
and
∑
imi ∈ {−1,+1}), and k + 1 messages should be
identical. Since the votes and their shares belong to the set
{−1,+1}, participants cannot differentiate between a vote
and its shares. Hence, for a participant who wants to vote
for +1-value, the participant has to send k + 1 messages
containing +1-value and the other k messages with -1-value.
Let us recall that some participants could send their votes in
single shares (i.e. a single message containing −1 or +1).
Hence, when a proxy receives a message from a given client
node, the proxy could not distinguish if such share was
generated as a single one or it is one among the previously
generated 2k+1 shares. Once a node has generated its 2k+1
messages, it sends each of them to a distinct proxy. Once
every node in the system has received one share from each
of its clients, the sharing phase is over (Algorithm 2).
Step 2: Counting. (Fig. 2 (b)) Recall that in the sharing
Algorithm 2 Sharing phase
Procedure vote(v, Pp) is
1. m = v
2. if (|Pp| == 1) then
3. send[share,m](Pp)
4. else
5. for each proxy ∈ Pp do
6. send([share,m], proxy)
7. m = −m
8. end for
9. end if
upon event < receive|[share,m] > do
10. it = it+m
step, each participant node within a group gi−1, sends a
single share or (2k + 1) shares to its proxies in the group
gi. Now, in the intermediate counting step, each proxy
within the receiving group gi will compute the sum of the
received shares from its clients in the group gi−1 (Line 10 in
Algorithm 2). The value of the counted sum is designated as
the Individual Tally (ITj =
∑
im
j
i , such that m
j
i represents
a message sent from participantpi to pj). Note that each
proxy will have its own individual tally. Each node waits
for the reception of the expected number of shares from its
clients (i.e. based on the list of his clients).
Algorithm 3 Counting phase
Procedure local count(it, Po) is
1. for each officemate ∈ Po do
2. send([IndividualTally, it], officemate)
3. end for
upon event < receive|[IndividualTally, t] > do
4. lt = lt+ t
Once a participant node has received the expected number
of shares, it broadcasts the computed individual tally to its
ofﬁcemates (Lines 1-3 in Algorithm 3). Each ofﬁcemate will
compute the sum of the received individual tallies resulting
in a local tally of its group (LTj =
∑
p∈g ITp ) (Line 4
in Algorithm 3). Then, each ofﬁcemate will forward the
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computed local tally to its proxies in the next group.
Step 3: Broadcasting. (Fig. 2 (c)) In the previous step,
each ofﬁcemate has calculated the local tally of its group.
During the local tally forwarding step, each ofﬁcemate will
send the local tally of its group to its proxies (Lines 1-
3 in Algorithm 4). If all the ofﬁcemates are honest, their
computation leads to the same value of the local tally. Once
a participant node in the group gi receives the local tally of
its group gi from the client in the previous group gi−1, the
local tally is no longer forwarded. When a participant node
receives local tallies of all groups, the global tally will be
computed by summing these local tallies (GT =
∑G−1
g=0 LTg
). In this case, such value has crossed the ring and received
in its initial sender. This global tally is the global outcome of
the polling session. Note that all participants should compute
the global tally after reception of local tallies.
Algorithm 4 Broadcasting phase
Procedure local tally broadcast(i, lt, Pp) is
1. for each proxy ∈ Pp do
2. send([LocalTally, i, lt], proxy)
3. end for
upon event < receive|[LocalTally, igroup, t] > do
4. S[igroup] = S[igroup] ∪ t
5. if (S[igroup] = |Pc|) then
6. local tally broadcast(i, T [igroup])
7. end if
V. CORRECTNESS AND COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
A. PDP’s Accuracy
In order to prove the correctness of the suggested PDP
algorithm, we assume that all participants are honest respect-
ing the protocol rules. An honest participant votes using a
single or 2k+1 messages and remains conform to the rules
of the PDP protocol.
Theorem: Assume a polling system with only honest
participants, where each participant votes with a single
message mi = vi or 2k + 1 messages
∑2k+1
j=1 mj = vi,
the PDP algorithm terminates and each participant node
eventually outputs the total sum of the participants votes
(
∑
p vp).
Proof: (Correctness). In order to prove the accuracy
of this protocol, we will start from the ﬁrst phase. For
a given group gi−1 , the sum of messages sent by this
group is equal to S =
∑r
s=1
∑2k+1
j=1 mj,s +
∑|gi−1|
s=r+1ms =∑r
s=1 [(k + 1)vs + k(−vs)] +
∑|gi−1|
s=r+1 vs =
∑
p∈gi−1 vp.
Where p is a participant node, r is the number of participants
within the group gi−1 using 2k+1 messages to express their
votes and mj,s is thejth message sent by the participant s.
In the second step, members of the group gi will receive a
set of messages from the group gi−1. The computed local
tally of the group gi is equal to LT =
∑
p′∈gi
∑
p∈gi−1 m
p′
p ,
where mp
′
p is a message sent from participant p to p
′. Since
we assume only honest nodes, the set of messages sent by
nodes in gi−1 is the set of ballots received in gi. Therefore,
the local tally computed in the given group gi reﬂects the
vote of all nodes in gi−1.
During the last step, each participant will forward local
tallies received along the ring. The global tally is computed
by each participant once all local tallies are received (i.e. the
number of local tallies is equal to the number of groups).
Since participants do honestly forward the local tallies along
the ring and the messages are eventually received, each node
ends up with the correct values for the local tallies of every
group, thus the correct global tally GT =
∑G−1
g=0 LTg =∑
p∈{N1} vp +
∑
p∈{N2k+1} vp, where {N1} is the set of
participants using a unique message and {N2k+1} represents
the set of participants using 2k+1 messages to express their
votes.
Proof: (Termination). In the proposed protocol each
participant knows the number of its proxies, its clients and
its ofﬁcemates. So nodes know the number of messages they
are supposed to receive in each step. Since every participant
node sends the required number of messages and every
message eventually arrives, each step completes. As the
algorithm is a ﬁnite sequence of steps (i.e. 3 steps), it is
guaranteed to eventually terminate.
B. PDP’s Complexity
In order to compare the complexity of DPol, the dis-
tributed polling protocol proposed in [1], and PDP, we have
measured the average of the number of messages sent by a
participant during different phases of the protocol, and the
average time spent to execute the algorithm. Let us note
that the performance measurements are made based on an
experimentation of the PDP protocol.
In DPol, all participants share their votes into 2k + 1
messages. The asymptotic average number of messages sent
by a node in group gi is O(G.k + |gi|) [1]. Since in
PDP only a subset of participants will share its votes into
2k+1 messages, we predict that DPol will be r times more
expensive than PDP in terms of message complexity, where
r is the proportion of nodes voting with a single message.
The protocols were launched several times, varying the
number of nodes and the number of groups. Figures [3 -
6] show the impact of the number of nodes on the number
of exchanged messages and voting duration. The number of
nodes varies from 50 to 400. It shows that PDP requires
fewer messages than DPol and the execution time is lower
compared to DPol’s voting duration even if they have the
same number of steps. Figure 3 shows that the number of
messages increases linearly with the number of nodes for
both protocols, but PDP scales better than DPol. In ﬁgure 4,
the difference in the number of messages between DPol and
PDP becomes increasingly wide, which is due to the fact
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Figure 3. Number of messages vs. Number of nodes (10 groups)
Figure 4. Number of messages vs. Number of groups (10 nodes per group)
Figure 5. Voting duration vs. Number of nodes (10 groups)
that increasing the number of groups leads to an increase in
the number of nodes.
Figure 6. Voting duration vs. Number of groups (10 nodes per group)
The aim of ﬁgures 5 and 6 consists in studying the impact
of the number of nodes and groups on voting duration for
DPol and PDP. Figures 5 and 6 show the gain in terms
of duration. The ﬁgures depict that the necessary time for
the voting session increases with the increase of number of
groups and nodes.
VI. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
A. Reliable Detection
In this section, we will discuss the case when the vote
of a given participant may be disclosed. Let us recall that
participants express their votes either in the form of 2k+ 1
messages or by sending only a single message. There are
two cases where the vote of a participant can be surely
disclosed. The ﬁrst case is when k + 1 dishonest proxies
received k + 1 messages containing the most represented
value. The second case consists in participants using only 1
message to express their votes. In order to know the type
of a given message, at least N − 2k + 1 dishonest proxies
must collude, where N is the number of participants in a
group. Therefore, if one of them receives the message of
a participant using a single share, the vote of the sender
will be certainly disclosed. Since the nodes are uniformly
distributed, we can estimate the upper bound of the number
of dishonest nodes in a group. Let us note B the maximum
number of dishonest participants in a group.
Lemma 1: The probability, for a given participant using
2k + 1 messages, to have its vote recovered by a coalition
of B ≥ k + 1 dishonest nodes is bounded by ( rN )(BN )k+1.
Proof 1: Participants using 2k + 1 messages to express
their votes, send k+1 messages with a given value (i.e. −1
or +1). The vote of such participant is surely revealed by a
coalition of dishonest participants if and only if k+1 proxies
that received the k+1 shares containing the most represented
value collude. In PDP, only r participants split their votes,
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so the probability that the vote of these participants to be
disclosed is ( rN )[
(
B
k+1
)
/
(
N
k+1
)
] ≤ ( rN )(BN )k+1.
Lemma 2: The probability, for a given participant using
a single message, to have its vote recovered by a coalition
of B ≥ N − 2k + 1 dishonest nodes is (BN )(N−rN ).
Proof 2: The vote of a participant, using only a single
message to express its vote, can be disclosed if and only
if N − 2k + 1 dishonest proxies collude and one of these
proxies receives the vote of the victim. This is due to the
fact that the messages do not contain any information about
their types either being a single or a shared message (i.e.
the sender has split its vote or not). Thus, the probability
that the vote of a participant using a single message to be
surely disclosed is (BN )(
N−r
N ), where r is the number of
participants sharing their votes.
Theorem: When at least 2k−1 participants are honest, the
probability for a given participant to have its vote recovered
with certainty by a coalition of B dishonest nodes is bounded
by ( rN )(
B
N )
k+1.
Proof: The vote of a participant using 2k + 1 messages
can be disclosed only if k+1 proxies that received the most
represented value collude. Accordingly, if the number of
dishonest nodes B is less than k+1, the vote of a participant
using 2k+1 messages cannot be surely revealed even if all
dishonest nodes collude. However, if they are more than
k + 1 dishonest nodes, the probability that the vote can be
disclosed is bounded by the value ( rN )(
B
N )
k+1 (Lemma 1).
On the other hand, the votes of participants using single
messages require at least N − 2k + 1 colluding dishonest
nodes to be disclosed with certainty, and the probability
of a certain detection is equal to (BN )(
N−r
N ) (Lemma 2).
Summing the conditional probabilities (Lemmas 1 and 2)
bounds, in the worst case (i.e. where B ≥ N − 2k + 1),
the probability of a certain detection by : ( rN )(
B
N )
k+1 +
(N−rN )(
B
N ). However, saying that B ≥ N − 2k + 1 means
that less than 2k−1 participants are honest. This condition is
rarely true. Therefore, the probability in general is bounded
by ( rN )(
B
N )
k+1.
Privacy comparison
In order to compare the privacy in DPol with the privacy
ensured by PDP, we have traced the curves that represent
the probability that the vote of a given participant will be
certainly discovered. Figure 7 displays the variation of this
probability according to the number of dishonest nodes.
In this study, we consider a group of 100 participants
with k = 1 (i.e. participants using 2k + 1 messages will
send 3 messages to express their votes). r is the number of
participants using 2k + 1 shares, this value changes from
one curve to another in ﬁgure 7. In the x-axis, we have the
number of dishonest participants and the y-axis represents
the probability that the vote of a participant is certainly
disclosed.
Figure 7. Privacy in PDP and DPol
Figure 8. Impact of participant sharing their votes on the probability of
reliable detection
As depicted in ﬁgure 7, PDP in all its variants offers
more privacy than DPol as long as the number of dishonest
participants does not exceed N − 2k+1. In addition, when
the number of participants using 2k+1 messages decreases,
the privacy increases. Thus, we get the maximum privacy of
PDP, based on reliable detection, when just one participant
shares its vote and the number of dishonest participants is
less than N − 2k + 1.
Figure 8 represents the impact of the parameter r (i.e. the
number of participants expressing their votes with 2k + 1
messages) on the probability of reliable detection. From this
ﬁgure, we can easily conclude that the privacy decreases
with the increase of the parameter r.
These results are due to the fact that, dishonest nodes are
willing to be sure about the disclosed participants’ votes.
If dishonest nodes receive a single message from an honest
participant, they have to verify that this participant has a
single proxy. This veriﬁcation cannot be done if they are
less than N − 2k + 1 nodes. Thereby, detecting votes of
participants using 2k + 1 messages is easier than detecting
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votes of participants using single messages since k + 1
dishonest nodes sufﬁce. For this reason, when the number
of participants sharing their votes increases, the probability
of the certain detection increases.
Let us recall that the current analysis consists in re-
liable detection of honest participant’s vote. This means
that dishonest nodes will be sure that the revealed value
represents the real vote. In the next subsection, we focus on
the uncertain detection where participants are not sure of the
certainty of the detected vote.
B. Uncertain Detection
The aim of the subsection is to study the uncertain
detection of an honest participant’s vote. The uncertain
detection consists in detecting votes without sureness. This
happens when a set of dishonest participants agree on the
following rule: {upon reception of a single message, it will
be considered as the sender’s vote}. This means that, when
a set of dishonest proxies receives a single message from an
honest client, they will suppose that the received message is
the client’s vote. When their decision is correct, they succeed
to discover the vote. However, they fail if the node has sent
2k+1 messages to express its vote, and the set of dishonest
nodes received only a message which does not represent
the participant’s vote. Dishonest participants will succeed to
disclose the vote if one of the following events occurs:
• The honest participant has sent only a single message
and it was received by dishonest proxies.
• The second case is when the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
– The client has sent 2k+1 messages to express his
vote.
– The set of dishonest proxies received only one
message representing the participant’s vote.
– The other k messages and their complementary
were received by honest participants.
The probability to discover the vote of an honest par-
ticipant is P = P (Dj/j∈{N2k+1}).P (j ∈ {N2k+1}) +
P (Dj/j∈{N1}).P (j ∈ {N1}) where {N1} represents the set
of participants voting with single messages and {N2k+1} is
the set of participants voting with 2k + 1 messages. While
r is the number of participants sharing their votes, P (j ∈
{N2k+1}) = rN and P (j ∈ {N1}) = N−rN . It is clear that
the probability of the ﬁrst event is equal to P (Dj/j∈{N1}) =
B
N . The probability of the second event is expressed
after reduction by the formula: P (Dj/j∈{N2k+1}) =
[
(
B
1
)(
N−B
k
)(
N−B−k
k
)
/
(
N
k+1
)(
N−k−1
k
)
]. By summing the
conditional probabilities, we can conclude that the probabil-
ity of the uncertain detection may be expressed as follows:
P = BN [
N−r
N + r(k + 1)
∏B−1
i=0
N−2k−i
N−i ].
Figure 9 shows the impact of dishonest nodes on the
probability of the uncertain detection. As depicted in this
ﬁgure, the probability of uncertain detection increases with
Figure 9. Uncertain detection
the decrease of the number of participants sharing their
votes. Therefore, the reliable detection of participants’ votes
decreases if the number of participants sharing their votes
decreases. But, this is offset by the increasing uncertain
detection. This suggests that the parameter r that represents
the number of nodes splitting their votes should be chosen
according to the strategy of dishonest participants. If we
assume that dishonest participants will try to get any in-
formation about participants’ votes, we should augment the
value of r resulting in a decreasing probability of uncertain
detection. Otherwise, we should choose a smaller value of
r to decrease the probability of the reliable detection.
C. Combining Reliable and Uncertain Detections
In this subsection, we consider dishonest nodes trying
to disclose an honest participant vote either being sure of
the detected value or not. The dishonest participant will
ﬁrstly try to detect certainly the participant’s vote (respecting
reliable detection rules). If they did not succeed to disclose
the vote with certainty, they will use the uncertain detection
(based on uncertain detection rule).
The probability of detecting a participant vote, consider-
ing such adversary act, is equal to the maximum of certain
and uncertain detection probabilities.
Figure 10 shows the probability of detection with an
increasing number of nodes sharing their votes. We consider
the case where a group of 100 participants uses either 1 or 3
messages to express their votes (i.e. k = 1), and B = 3N/4
are dishonest. As depicted in the ﬁgure, in a system of
N = 100 nodes where 3N/4 are dishonest. We get the
best privacy when r = 62 participants split their votes into
3 messages, leading to a maximum probability of detection
equals to 0.3476.
VII. MALICIOUS ACT ANALYSIS
After studying different possibilities to reveal participants’
votes, the aim of this section is to look into the impact
of dishonest nodes on the ﬁnal outcome of the protocol.
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Figure 10. Maximum of the probabilities of detection
Dishonest participants may lead different types of attacks.
These attacks aim at biasing the global outcome.
Participants splitting their votes may affect the global
outcome without being detected with probability 1 by one
of the following attacks:
• They can send more than k+1 messages with the same
value. This attack may occur during the ﬁrst phase of
the protocol (i.e. the sharing phase).
• During the computation of the individual tally, a dis-
honest participant may invert the content of some
messages.
A participant expressing its vote with a single message
may affect the global outcome without being detected with
probability 1 only during the computation of the individual
tally. As a dishonest node receives |Pc| messages, in the
worst case, the node receives N messages, thus the maxi-
mum impact is 2N .
As discussed above, participants sending 2k+1 messages
to express their votes may affect the global tally by two
ways. The ﬁrst way consists in sending more than k + 1
messages with the same value (i.e. k+5 +1-messages, k−4
-1-messages). In the worst case, the client sends 2k + 1
messages with the same value leading to a maximum impact
on the outcome equals to 2k. The second kind of dishonest
acts occurs during the individual tally computation where
the impact on the output is bounded by 2N . This leads to
a global impact of 2(k + N) for participants sharing their
votes.
Assuming that α dishonest nodes share their votes, the
impact of the set of dishonest participants on the global
outcome is bounded by 2(kα+BN).
Therefore, the number of nodes splitting their votes has
an impact on the protocol complexity, the ensured privacy,
and on the result’s accuracy due to dishonest act. If the votes
require higher privacy, we can assume the uncertain detec-
tion. Thus, we should advance the number of participants
sharing their votes to enhance the privacy. Consequently,
the complexity and the impact on the outcome will increase.
Otherwise, if we care only of the certain detection of partici-
pants’ votes, the number of nodes splitting their votes should
be decreased in order to reduce the number of exchanged
messages and the impact on the global outcome.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents PDP, a probabilistic Private Dis-
tributed Polling protocol that allows a set of users to conduct
a poll without revealing their inputs. The polling result
is computed by participants themselves without interaction
with a third entity, be it trusted or not. PDP does not
rely on heavyweight cryptographic techniques. We proved
that data privacy preserved by the protocol is ensured with
certain probability and it is related to a decision rule used
by dishonest participants. PDP ensures privacy such that a
participant input is only known with certainty to its owner
when the number of dishonest participants is not over a
threshold. In the absence of data loss or malicious acts, the
polling protocol is accurate. We proved also that the impact
of dishonest participants on the global outcome is bounded
by 2(kα + BN). As future work, we plan to enhance the
robustness of the protocol and we plan to study its behavior
under node departure.
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